The objective of this paper is to develop a new solution methodology for matrix games, in which goals are viewed as intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) and the elements of the pay-off matrix are represented by triangular intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (TIFNs). In this methodology, a suitable ranking function is defined to establish an order relation between two TIFNs, and the concept of intuitionistic fuzzy (I-fuzzy) inequalities is interpreted. Utilizing these inequality relations and ranking functions, a pair of linear programming models is derived from a pair of auxiliary intuitionistic fuzzy programming models. Based on the aspiration levels, this pair of linear programming models is solved to determine the optimal strategies for both players of the game. The proposed method in this paper is illustrated with a voting share problem to demonstrate the validity and applicability of the method.
Introduction
In traditional game theory, the precise assessment information is difficult due to a lack of information about the exact values of certain parameters and the fuzzy understanding of various situations by players. Fuzzy set theory, which is a very useful tool in game theory, has achieved a substantial amount of success. (Campos [9] , Nishizaki and Sakawa [27, 28] , Bector and Chandra [8] , Nayak and Pal [21, 22] , Li [14, 16] , Vidyottama and Chandra [37] , Vijay et al. [38, 39] , Liu and Kao [18] , Cevikel and Ahlatcioglu [10] , Kacher and Larbani [12] , Seikh et al. [32, 33] ). However, a fuzzy set only employs a membership degree. The degree of nonmembership is automatically equal to the complement to 1: In real situations, however, players/decision makers often do not express the degree of non-membership as the complement to 1: Players/decision makers may exhibit some degree of hesitation. Therefore, a fuzzy set has no means of incorporating a degree of hesitation.
The intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS), which is a generalization of fuzzy set theory, was introduced by Atanassov [4, 5] ; it is suitable for solving problems concerning vagueness. An IFS is characterized by two functionsda function that expresses the degree of membership and a function that expresses the degree of non-membershipdthus, the sum of both values is less than or equal to 1. The degree of hesitation is equal to one minus the sum of the degree of membership and the degree of non-membership. Therefore, the concept of the IFS is considered to be an alternative approach for defining a fuzzy set in cases where available information is insufficient for defining an imprecise concept by conventional fuzzy sets. Therefore, an IFS can be employed to simulate the human decisionmaking process and any activity that requires human expertise and knowledge, which are inevitably imprecise or not completely reliable. Atanassov [6] discussed an open problem about the interpretation of an IFS in different optimization problems. Angelov [3] was the first researcher to answer this problem by implementing an optimization technique in an intuitionistic fuzzy environment. However, an IFS can be applied to game problems as the players have some degree of hesitation about appropriate pay-off values and the selection of a strategy for each of the pay-offs.
Intuitionistic fuzziness in matrix games is generally applied using two methods: in the first method, players have I-fuzzy goals; in the second method, the elements of the pay-off matrix are represented by intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (Li [13] , Seikh et al. [30] ). Recent studies have focused on the application of an IFS to resolve game problems. Atanassov [6] described a game problem using an IFS. Li and Nan [17] developed a nonlinear programming approach to matrix games with pay-offs of Atanassov's IFS. Aggarwal et al. [1, 2] extended the duality results for two-person zero-sum matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy pay-offs to an I-fuzzy scenario. Nan et al. [20] implemented a lexicographic method for matrix games in which pay-offs are represented by TIFNs. Li et al. [15] employed a bi-objective programming approach to solve a matrix game with pay-offs of TIFNs. Bandyopadhyay et al. [7] solved matrix games with intuitionistic fuzzy pay-offs using a score function. Nan and Li [19] outlined a linear programming approach to solve matrix games with I-fuzzy goals. Seikh et al. [31, 34, 36] investigated matrix games in which goals are represented as an IFS or elements of a pay-off matrix are represented by TIFNs. Nayak and Pal [23, 24] constructed auxiliary linear programming models to solve bimatrix games with goals expressed by an IFS. Seikh et al. [29, 35] applied TIFNs to bi-matrix games. No study has investigated matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs. In this paper, a new methodology, in which goals are represented as an IFS and elements of a pay-off matrix are represented by TIFNs, is introduced to solve matrix games. The idea of double I-fuzzy inequalities, i.e., the I-fuzzy inequalities and the parameters that are represented by I-fuzzy numbers, is outlined. The concept of TIFNs and their arithmetic operations and cut sets are recalled. A new order relation is proposed to rank the two TIFNs. A pair of linear programming models is derived from a pair of auxiliary Ifuzzy programming models using these ranking order relations. These two models are solved by aspiration levels, and the optimal strategies for both players are obtained.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some definitions and preliminaries about an IFS and TIFNs are recalled and a ranking function is defined to establish an order relation between two TIFNs. Section 3 describes the application of an IFS in optimization and the concept of double I-fuzzy constraint conditions. The main problem about the matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs is formulated in Section 4. The solution procedure of these games is conceptualized by the degree of acceptance and the degree of rejection of the I-fuzzy aspiration levels for two players. The results are illustrated by considering a voting share problem in Section 5. Section 6 reflects the conclusions of this paper.
Definitions and preliminaries

Intuitionistic fuzzy sets
The intuitionistic fuzzy set, which was introduced by Atanassov [5] , is characterized by two functions that express the degree of belongingness and the degree of non-belongingness. Definition 1. Let U ¼ fx 1 ; x 2 ; /; x n g be a finite universal set. The Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) b A in a given universal set U is an object with the form
where the functions m b A : U/½0; 1 and g b A : U/½0; 1 define the degree of membership and the degree of non-membership, respectively, of an element x2U to the set A4U such that they satisfy the following conditions: In this section, the definitions are derived from Li [13] .
Definition 3. (TIFN)
The TIFNã¼ h(a l , a, a r ); w a , u a i is a convex IFS on the set < of real numbers with a l < a < a r , whose membership function and non-membership function are defined as
and
as depicted in Fig. 1 . The values w a and u a represent the maximum degree of membership and the minimum degree of non-membership, respectively, such that they satisfy the following conditions: 0 w a 1,0 u a 1 and 0 w a þ u a 1. Let pã (x) ¼ 1Àm e a (x)Ànã(x), which is referred to as the I-fuzzy index of an element x in the TIFNa. It is the degree of indeterminacy membership of the element x to the TIFN e a.
If m e a (x)þnã(x) ¼ 1 c x 2 U, thenã ¼ h(a l , a, a r ); w a , u a i is reduced toã ¼ h (a l , a, a r ); w a ,1 e w a i, which is a triangular fuzzy number (TFN). The definition of a TIFN is a generalization of the definition of the TFN, which was introduced by Dubois and Prade [11] . Two new parametersdw a and u a dare introduced to reflect the confidence level of a TIFN and the non-confidence level of a TIFN, respectively. Therefore, a TIFN may express more uncertainty compared with a TFN. The set of all TIFNs is denoted byF(<). 
Similarly, for any b 2[u a ,1], a b-cut set of the TIFÑ a ¼ hða l; a; a r Þ; w a ; u a i can be expressed as a crisp subset of <, as
In the next context, we discuss the value index and ambiguity index of a TIFN.
be any acut set and a b-cut set, respectively, of the TIFÑ a ¼ hða l; a; a r Þ; w a ; u a i. Then, the values of the membership function and non-membership function are defined as. 
Thus, the values of membership function and non-membership function of the TIFN e a ¼ hða l; a; a r Þ; w a ; u a i are calculated as follows:
D m (ã) and D n (ã) reflect information about the membership degrees and non-membership degrees. Similarly, the ambiguities of the membership function and nonmembership function for any TIFN a are defined by
represent the length of the intervalã a and the length of the intervalã b , respectively. Therefore, E m (ã) and E n (ã) represent the measure of uncertainty in e a.
Using (4) and (5) Then, for any real number k 2 <, the following equalities are valid:
In the following definitions, a ranking function is defined based on the difference between the value index and the ambiguity index to obtain an order relation between two TIFNs. Definition 8. A ranking function (or defuzzification function) is the function F:F(<) /<, whereF(<) is a set of all TIFNs that are defined on <, which maps each TIFN into a real line. Let e a be a TIFN.
Assume thatã andb be two TIFNs and l 2 [0,1] be any real number.
Then, a new order relation betweenã and e b is defined as follows:
' is an intuitionistic fuzzy version of the order relation ' ' on the set of real numbers and has the linguistic interpretation as 'essentially less than or equal to'. Similarly, the symbols 'd ' are the intuitionistic fuzzy versions of the order relations '!' and '¼' on the set of real numbers and have the linguistic interpretations 'essentially greater than or equal to' and 'essentially equal to', respectively. This proposed ranking method satisfies axioms, namely, the reasonable properties proposed by Wang and Kerre [40] .
Proposition 3. Letã andb be any two TIFNs. Then, for any real number k, the following equality holds
This shows that the proposed ranking function is linear for these types of TIFNs.
Application of IFS to optimization model
Any optimization model includes objective(s) and constraints. Intuitionistic fuzzy optimization (IFO), is an extension of fuzzy optimization, in which the degree of rejection of objective(s) and constraints are considered with the degree of satisfaction (refer to Angelov [3] , Nayak and Pal [24] ). Let U be the universal set. Let G i , i ¼ 1,2, …,r, be the set of r goals and C j , j ¼ 1,2, …,m, be the set of m constraints, each of which can be characterized by an IFS on U. The In the following context, we provide an interpretation of inequality relations in an I-fuzzy environment.
Interpretation of I-fuzzy inequalities
Let x, a 2 < and let p 0 , q 0 (>0) 2 <. Then the intuitionistic fuzzy statement 'xd p0,q0 a' to be read as " x is essentially greater than or equal to a with tolerances p 0 and q 0 " is expressed in terms of the following membership and non-membership functions (depicted in Fig 2) :
The DM is completely satisfied if x ! a and the tolerances p 0 , q 0 exist, in which the DM is partially satisfied, i.e., for (aÀp 0 ) < x < (aÀp 0 þ q 0 ), the sum of the degrees of acceptance and the degree of rejection is less than or equal to one. He/she will not be satisfied if x (aÀp 0 ). According to the IFO technique described in the I-fuzzy inequality relation 'x d p0,q0 , a' is expressed as Similarly, the I-fuzzy statement 'x7 r0, s0 a' to be read as "x is essentially less than or equal to a with tolerances r 0 and s 0 " is expressed in terms of the following membership and nonmembership functions: 1;
The DM is completely satisfied if x a and the tolerances r 0 and s 0 exist, in which the DM is partially satisfied, i.e., for (a þ r 0 e s 0 ) < x < (a þ r 0 ), the sum of the degree of acceptance and the degree of rejection is less than or equal to one. He/she will not be satisfied if x ! (a þ r 0 ). In a similar manner, the I-fuzzy inequality relations x7 r0, s0 a is expressed as x a þ r 0 ð1 À x 2 Þ and x ða þ r 0 Þ À s 0 ð1 À h 2 Þ where 0 x 2 1 and 0 h 2 1.
Interpretation of double I-fuzzy constraints
In this subsection, the concept of double I-fuzzy inequalities, i.e., the I-fuzzy constraints that involve I-fuzzy numbers, is interpreted. Based on the resolution method that was proposed in the previous section, we extend the interpretation of I-fuzzy inequalities to the case in which the parameters and the adequacies are also I-fuzzy numbers. LetS,B andC be the m Â n matrix, the m Â 1 vector and the n Â 1 vector with entries fromF(<) and the double I-fuzzy constraints under consideration be expressed asS X d 
Mathematical model of a matrix game
Let {1, 2, …, m} be the set of pure strategies that are available to player I and let {1,2, …,n} be the set of pure strategies that are available for player II. When player I chooses the pure strategy i and player II chooses the pure strategy j, then a ij is a payoff for player I and Àa ij is a payoff for player II. The two-person zero-sum matrix game G can be represented as a pay-off matrix, Owen [26] A ¼ [25] introduced the concept of mixed strategy in classical form. We denote the sets of all mixed strategies, which are referred to as strategy spaces, that are available for players I and II by
where < m þ denotes the mÀdimensional non-negative Euclidean space. Thus, by a crisp two-person zero-sum matrix game G, we indicate the triplet G ¼ (S I , S II , A). As each player is uncertain about which strategy he/she will choose, he/she will choose a probability distribution over the set of alternatives that are available to him/her or a mixed strategy in terms of game theory.
Matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs
Let S І ; S ІІ be the strategy spaces for player I and player II, respectively, and letÃ ¼ (ã ij ) mÂn be the pay-off matrix, where each a ij ¼ hða ijl ; a ij ; a ijr Þ; w aij ; u aij iði ¼ 1; 2; …m; j ¼ 1; 2; …nÞ is the TIFN defined in Section 2.2. Letṽ andw be two TIFNs that represent the aspiration levels of player I and player II, respectively. Then, a twoperson zero-sum matrix game with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay- Using this definition and employing a resolution procedure for the double I-fuzzy constraints proposed in Section 3, we can construct the following pair of I-fuzzy linear programming problems for player I and player II, respectively. (11) and (12) . Therefore, these problems will be converted as Subject to
:::; nÞ;
:::; nÞ; P m i¼1 x i ¼ 1; 
whereÃ i (Ã j ) denotes the ith row (jth column) ofÃ (i ¼ 1,2, …,m; j ¼ 1,2, …,n). By utilizing the ranking function F l :F /<(l 2[0,1]) (defined in Section 2.2, Definition 8), which preserves the ranking when I-fuzzy numbers are multiplied by non-negative scalars, these problems can be transformed into linear programming problems as Subject to
:::;nÞ;
Àh 1 Þðj ¼ 1;2;:::;nÞ;
and Subject to
:::;mÞ;
Here F l (Ã) i (F l (Ã) j ) denotes the ith row (jth column) of F l (Ã), where i ¼ 1,2, …,m and j ¼ 1,2, …,n. The two linear programming problems (15) and (16) can be written as
To solve the I-fuzzy matrix game g IFG, we have to solve the crisp linear programming problems (17) and (18) for player I and player II, respectively. If ( b x, b x 1 ,b h 1 ) is an optimal solution of (17), then b x is an optimal strategy for player I, b x 1 is the minimal Subject to
:::; mÞ;
:::; mÞ; Þ is equivalent to the two crisp linear programming problems (17) and (18), which can be easily solved by the simplex method.
Application to voting share problem
In this section, a voting share problem in a particular region is considered to demonstrate the application of the proposed methodology.
Assume that the two major political parties P1 and P2 participate in a parliamentary constituency election in a particular region. Let the secretaries of both the parties P1 and P2 aim to enhance their expected votes under the circumstance that the total number of voters in that region is fixed. The voting share percentage of one party increases while the voting share percentage of another party decreases. Assume that the secretaries of both parties are rational, i.e., they will choose optimal strategies to maximize their expected votes without cooperation. Assume that P1 has two strategies to increase their voting share: strategy ε 1 (campaigning by media), and ε 2 (campaigning by hosting rallies). Let P2 possess the same strategies as P1. This problem may be regarded as a matrix game, namely, the parties P1 and P2 are regarded as player I and player II, respectively. They may use strategies ε 1 and ε 2 . Due to a lack of information or imprecise available information, the secretaries of the two parties are usually not able to precisely forecast the voting percentage. They estimate the voting percentage with a certain degree of confidence but they may hesitate regarding the estimation of expected votes. To address the uncertainty, TIFNs are employed to express the voting share for a particular political party. The pay-off matrixÃ for both the parties is expressed as where 〈ð175; 180; 190Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉 in the matrixÃ is a TIFN, which indicates that the expected votes in favour of P 1 is "approximately 180" when parties P 1 and P 2 simultaneously apply the strategy ε 1 (campaigning by media). The maximum degree of confidence of the secretary is 0.6, whereas the minimum degree of non-confidence is 0.2. His/her degree of hesitation is 0.2. Other elements in the matrixÃ are similarly explained.
We assume that the aspiration levels for player I and player II areṽ ¼ 〈ð160; 170; 180Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉 andw ¼ 〈ð145; 160; 165Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉:
The tolerance levels for player I and player II are
The value indexes and ambiguity indexes of a ij ¼ hða ijl ; a ij ; a ijr Þ; w a ij ; u a ij i ði ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ 1; 2Þ can be obtained as follows: According to equations (17) and (18), the linear programming models for players I and II are obtained as follows:
and Solving (19) and (20) with the help of LINGO software, we obtained the optimal strategies for players I and II for differentl2½0; 1, as depicted in Table 1 .
As shown in Table 1 
Conclusions
In this paper, matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and the pay-offs represented by TIFNs are explored. A solution methodology is proposed to solve these games. First, the concept of double I-fuzzy inequality constraints is interpreted with regard to aspiration levels and adequacies. Second, a defuzzification function (ranking function) is defined based on the value index and ambiguity index of TIFNs. A pair of I-fuzzy programming models is established for two players. Based on the resolution method of double I-fuzzy constraints and by applying the ranking functions, these two models are transformed into two crisp linear programming models that can be solved by a simplex method to obtain the optimal strategies. The numerical example indicates that the optimal strategies for both players are dependent on their subjective preference information.
The main advantage of this method is that it provides not only the degree of acceptance but also the degree of rejection of the aspiration levels for both players. The proposed methodology in this paper differs from the proposed methodology of Nan et al. [19, 20] , Seikh et al. [31, 34, 36] , Aggarwal et al. [1] , Bandyopadhyay et al. [7] and Li et al. [15] , as they employed an IFS to express goals or only considered pay-offs as I-fuzzy numbers. However, neither of these studies include I-fuzzy inequalities in their models with the pay-offs that are represented by I-fuzzy numbers. In our methodology, the inequalities are I-fuzzy, whereas the pay-offs are also described by I-fuzzy numbers. The major limitation of this proposed methodology is that it is dependent on the ranking function. Different types of ranking functions yield different types of solution. A more general methodology will be investigated in the future.
Although the proposed method is illustrated with the voting share problem, it can be applied in decision-making theory in areas such as economics, operations research, management, and war science.
